



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE



Community Performance Index (CPI) of Fisheries Co-management in Four Major Lakes in Malawi

Fisheries Integration of Society and Habitats (FISH)

PREPARED FOR: USAID

AWARD NUMBER: AID-612-A-14-00004

PREPARED BY: Pact Inc., and Partners.

DATE: 30th December, 2015



Cover Page Photograph: A busy fish landing beach Upper Shire River

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The on-the-ground research for this CPI was carried out from March-July 2015 by a team of four researchers – including Pact HQ and FISH staff, supported by partner FISH Technicians and their counterparts. The process was led by Dr. Dick Kachilonda, Governance and Capacity Development Specialist based out of Mangochi, with support from Ms. Jaqueline Ndirangu, Pact Capacity Development Advisor in Nairobi, Kenya, and Stanley Mvula and Richard Kachala Program Managers from local partners CEPA and CISER respectively. We are indebted to them for the ground work that lead to this Report and to the many participating parties who contributed through key informant interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions (FGDs) and who provided secondary sources.

CITATION:

FISH (2015) A Community Performance Index (CPI) of Fisheries Co-management in Four Major Lakes in Malawi. USAID/FISH Project Publication, Lilongwe, Malawi: 52 p.

DISCLAIMER:

Prepared under USAID Cooperative Agreement No. AID-612-A-14-00004, awarded on September 9, 2014, entitled Malawi Fisheries Integration for Society and Habitat (FISH) Project.

This report is made possible by the generous support of the American People through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents are the sole responsibility of Pact, Inc. and FISH and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government.

CONTACT ADDRESS:

Phesheya Vilakazi
pvilakazi@pactworld.org
+1-202-466-5666
1828 L Street NW
Suite 300
Washington, DC 20036

Pact Malawi
Amina House
P.O. Box 1013
Lilongwe, Malawi
Phone: +2651751220; +2651751201
Email infomw@pactworld.org

Contents

Abbreviations and Acronyms	i
1. Introduction.....	1
1.1. History of Fisheries Governance in Malawi	2
1.2. Decentralization and Fisheries Co-Management	2
1.3. FISH’s Approach to Community Development	6
2. Methodology	7
2.1. The Data Collection Tool.....	7
2.2. Adapting the CPI to the FISH Project Context.....	7
2.3. Sampling for Data Collection	9
2.4. Data Collection	9
2.5. Data Analysis	10
3. Results	1
3.1. Results by Type of Structure.....	1
3.1.1. BVC Results.....	1
3.1.2. VDC Results	3
3.2. Results by Waterbody	5
3.2.1. Lake Chilwa	5
3.2.2. Lake Chiuta.....	8
3.2.3. SWA of Lake Malawi	11
3.2.4. SEA of Lake Malawi	14
3.2.5. Upper Shire River	16
3.2.6. Lake Malombe	18
4. Comparison of CPI, GGB, and APEA Findings	20
5. Implications of CPI Results for the FISH Project	21
6. Recommendations	22
Resources	24

Tables

Table 1: Co-Management Actors and Their Roles in Malawi	4
Table 2: BVCs Registered by District and Waterbody	5
Table 3: CPI Domains and Definitions by Sub-Domain	8
Table 4: Co-Management Structures Assessed using CPI.....	10
Table 5. Aggregate CPI Scores for BVCs and VDCs in Lake Chilwa	5
Table 6: Aggregate CPI Scores for BVCs and VDCs in Lake Chiuta.....	8
Table 7: Aggregate CPI Scores for BVCs and VDCs in SWA of Lake Malawi	11
Table 8: Aggregate CPI Scores for BVCs and VDCs in SEA of Lake Malawi	14
Table 9: Aggregate CPI Scores for BVCs and VDCs in Upper Shire River	17
Table 10: Aggregate CPI Scores for BVCs and VDCs in Lake Malombe	18

Figures

Figure 1: FISH's TOC for Capacity Development	6
Figure 2a: Performance of All BVCs by CPI Domain and Waterbody	1
Figure 2b: Performance of All BVCs by CPI Domain	1
Figure 3a: Performance of All VDCs by CPI Domain and Waterbody.....	4
Figure 3b: Performance of All VDCs by CPI Domain and Waterbody	4
Figure 4a: Performance of Lake Chilwa's BVCs by CPI Domain	6
Figure 4b: Performance of Lake Chilwa's BVCs by CPI Sub-Domain	6
Figure 5a: Performance of Lake Chilwa's VDCs by CPI Domains	7
Figure 5b: Performance of Lake Chilwa's VDCs by CPI Sub-Domains.....	7
Figure 6a: Performance of Lake Chiuta's BVCs by CPI Domains	9
Figure 6b: Performance of Lake Chiuta's BVCs by CPI Sub-Domains.....	9
Figure 7a: Performance of Lake Chiuta's VDC by CPI Domains.....	10
Figure 7b: Performance of Lake Chiuta's VDC by CPI Sub-Domains	10
Figure 8a: Performance of SWA of Lake Malawi's BVCs by CPI Domains.....	11
Figure 8b: Performance of SWA of Lake Malawi's BVCs by CPI Sub-Domains	12
Figure 9a: Performance of SWA of Lake Malawi's VDCs by CPI Domains	13
Figure 9b: Performance of SWA of Lake Malawi's VDCs by CPI Sub-Domains.....	13
Figure 10a: Performance of SEA of Lake Malawi's BVCs by CPI Domains	15
Figure 10b: Performance of SEA of Lake Malawi's BVCs by CPI Sub-Domains	15
Figure 11a: Performance of SEA of Lake Malawi's VDCs by CPI Domains.....	16
Figure 11b: Performance of SEA of Lake Malawi's VDCs by CPI Sub-Domains	16
Figure 12a: Performance of Upper Shire River's BVCs by CPI Domains.....	17
Figure 12b: Performance of Upper Shire River's BVCs by CPI Sub-Domains	17
Figure 13: Performance of Upper Shire River's VDC by CPI Sub-Domains	18
Figure 14a: Performance of Lake Malombe's BVCs by CPI Domains.....	19
Figure 14b: Performance of Lake Malombe's BVCs by CPI Sub-Domains	19
Figure 15: Performance of Lake Malombe's VDCs by CPI Sub-Domains.....	20

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ADC	Area Development Committee
APEA	applied political economy analysis
BVC	Beach Village Committee
CA	Christian Aid
CEPA	Center for Environment Policy and Advocacy
CISER	Community Initiative for Self-Reliance
CPI	Community Performance Index
CPR	common-pool resource
CSP	Pact's Capacity Solutions Platform
DOF	Department of Fisheries
EI	Emmanuel International
FA	fisheries association
FISH	Fisheries Integration of Society and Habitats Project
GGB	good governance barometer
GVH	group village headman
IEC	information, education, and communication (materials)
LFMA	local fisheries management authority
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
NRM	natural resource management
OPI	Pact's Organizational Performance Index
SEA	South East Arm
SWA	South West Arm
TA	traditional authority
TOC	theory of change
TOR	terms of reference
URI-CRC	University of Rhode Island Coastal Resources Center
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
VDC	Village Development Committee
WESM	Wildlife and Environment Society of Malawi

Executive Summary

The CPI is a Pact Inc tool that uses the four attributes of service provision as domains against which to assess and rate the performance of community structures. The four CPI domains are:

- (1) Quality of Service (Effectiveness)
- (2) Relevance
- (3) Resource Mobilization (Sustainability)
- (4) Efficiency

Each domain is further broken into two sub-domains. Each sub-domain is benchmarked from level 1 (lowest) to level 4 (highest). Descriptions and illustrative evidence are also provided for each of the levels per sub-domain.

Due to the large number of co-management structures in the five targeted fresh-water bodies, a total of 56 structures were initially sampled for the survey using a two-stage stratified random sampling methodology. The 56 structures comprised 35 BVCs, 16 VDCs and 5 ADCs. This sample size represents 30 percent of the total 160 BVC co-management structures in the four lakes of this study. Later, the plan to collect data from the ADCs was dropped after the pilot process showed they had little to no interaction with BVCs and VDCs on fishing issues, and could therefore not give a fair rating of the structure's performance on fisheries co-management.

A total of 35 BVCs were assessed using the CPI. Of this number, 29 scored themselves at level 1 for all four domains. This shows that a significant 83% of all BVCs surveyed are performing at the lowest level measured by the CPI. The findings are further illustrated in the graphs, suggest Chiuta was at a more advanced state of organization, but only marginally so.

On the other hand, 69% of VDCs rated themselves at the same level 1 for all domains. This shows that a larger proportion of BVCs are performing at the lowest level measured by the CPI and are equally receiving limited to no support from the VDC.

This implies that neither the BVCs nor the VDCs are not being effective in managing fisheries provisions. They are not setting performance targets, are not ensuring equal representation of people involved in fisheries, and do not monitor or evaluate performance. There is little leveraging of community and external resources to ensure sustainability, and there is low implementation of their fisheries management plan in a timely way, and limited allocation of provisions equitably to persons engaged in fisheries within their area of operation.

Reasons given by participants for this overall low performance include the lack of systems, tools and training on how to for instance ensure transparency, accountability and effective monitoring of BVC and VDC activities; lack of cooperation among BVC members, lack of power/authority to perform, presence of new committee members with a general lack of understanding of their TORs as the last training was in 2004.

Going forward, the CPI has made clear the need to strengthen the decentralized institutional framework for PFM, by anchoring the BVCs under a higher, ecosystem level lobby, the FA that is anchored at district level for support. Integrating the BVCs fully in the local government structure of VDCs is key as is using the TA as local champions of support.

1. Introduction

The need to define community institutional roles and pursue governance reforms in the management of natural resources, including fisheries, continues to gain momentum in Malawi and throughout the world. The open access nature of the common-pool resources (CPRs), including fisheries resources, remains a challenge in resource management. In the governance of the CPRs, the institutional arrangements may include state, common, private, non-property regimes, and user community. Although village-level administrations (ie Local Government Authority –LGA structures) do exist, they generally do not have the resources to police resource use, deliver quality and adequate services to meet community needs. In line with the community participation concept, Malawi fisheries policy adopted the co-management approach on governance at various levels to enable participation of the user communities. Co-management, in this context, is defined as a partnership arrangement where user groups and government share the power and authority to manage fisheries resources (Sen & Nielsen 1996).

The Fisheries Integration of Societies and Habitats (FISH) Project, a five-year U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)-funded project in the eastern region of Malawi, is grounded on a robust theory of change (TOC) that states:

If decisions around fisheries management (1) are based on shared, evidence-based objectives and learning, (2) are grounded in inclusive and effective ecosystem-scaled governance structures, and (3) strengthen the assets of communities, then Malawi's complex and diverse freshwater lake ecosystems can be sustained.

This will be achieved by strengthening the institutional and community capacities at an ecosystem level for fisheries co-management, climate change adaptation (CCA) and biodiversity conservation (BDC). As a result, FISH project activities are based on the premise that an engaged and empowered community fisheries governance system is critical to increasing the social, ecological, and economic resilience to climate change and biodiversity conservation of freshwater ecosystems and people who depend on them.

FISH is implemented by Pact, Inc. in conjunction with University of Rhode Island Coastal Resources Center (URI-CRC) and Christian Aid (CA) and includes the partners Community Initiative for Self-Reliance (CISER) and Center for Environment Policy and Advocacy (CEPA). CA oversees two additional partners, Emmanuel International (EI) and the Wildlife Society of Malawi (WESM). FISH benefits the fishing communities of the four ecological freshwater systems: the South East Arm (SEA) and East Bank South West Arm (SWA) of Lake Malawi, Lake Malombe, Lake Chiuta, Lake Chilwa, and Upper and Middle Shire River, which fall under the management and governance of the four districts of Mangochi, Machinga, Balaka, and Zomba. FISH activities center on strengthening the institutional capacity of co-management structures in order to be effective in implementing the community-based natural resources management (CBNRM) and conservation strategies.

Faced with expectations of increased accountability for the results of capacity-strengthening initiatives, FISH intends to move beyond anecdotal storytelling and output-level indicators toward clearly articulated TOCs that support outcome-level measurement of capacity-strengthening interventions that target an ecosystem approach to resource governance. Pact's innovative Community Performance Index (CPI), developed in 2013, enables evaluators to gauge the extent to which capacity-strengthening investments lead to improvements in the ability of informal community governance groups to deliver services in a fair, transparent and efficient manner. The tool was designed to be context-specific and simple to apply. Over

time, the CPI enables evaluation of change in community performance and correlation of capacity-strengthening inputs and community-level performance outcomes.

For FISH's capacity-strengthening interventions to be deemed a success, there is a need to gather baseline performance values against which to determine future changes. This is also important to evaluate whether the TOC achieves its intended outcomes regarding capacity strengthening. Therefore, this report highlights the results of the CPI baseline study and highlights the implications in terms of governance and capacity strengthening in the targeted four lakes of the project areas.

1.1. History of Fisheries Governance in Malawi

The Malawi Constitution (Republic of Malawi 1994; as amended) recognizes that responsible environmental management is vital to achieve sustainable development, improved standards of living, and conservation of natural resources. There are three systems responsible for fisheries governance in Malawi: 1) traditional, 2) government led, and 3) co-management (Hara 2006, Jamu et al. 2011).

The traditional authorities (TAs) are customary custodians of fisheries resources. At least informally, traditional chiefs control the rights to harvest resources within their geographical zone of authority. For some fisheries, the TAs have their own informal fisheries rules that are dependent on tenure rights and taboos (Jamu et al. 2011). The traditional management stems from pre-colonial times, when the lake resources were managed under a common property regime and when family heads, village headmen, and chiefs (Kasulo 2006) regulated fishing.


The Government led governance started with the establishment of the Department of Fisheries (DOF) in 1946 led to the transfer of the control and ownership of the lake resources from TAs to the central government (Kasulo 2006). However, over time, with diminishing budgets, the government authority has become weakened, and no longer able to adequately police the resources.

The community led governance arose some two decades ago when decentralization saw the devolution of fisheries co-management to Local Fisheries Management Authorities (LFMA). The premise was that the user groups were the best placed to regulate themselves and protect their fishing livelihood.

1.2. Decentralization and Fisheries Co-Management

Co-management governance arrangements started on a pilot scale on Lake Malombe in 1993 (Njaya 2002). This was adopted in order to improve the legitimacy, increase compliance with fisheries management rules, and to reduce illegal and over fishing (Russel 2011). During this time, the DOF introduced elected Beach Village Committees (BVCs) to represent fishing communities that shared in common a beach or landing site (Hara 2008). Co-management later became part of the decentralization process, which started in 1998 with the National Decentralization Policy and the Local Government Act. BVCs fall under the village structure, notably the Village Development Committee (VDC) and are often (wrongly) considered as sub-committees to Village Natural Resource Management Committees (VNRMC). VDCs are accountable to the TA or chief through their Area Development Committee (ADC). ADCs are made up of group village headmen (GVH). The chief is responsible to the district government to whom power is devolved by central government. In line with the TOC ecosystem approach, the Fisheries Regulations alludes to a "fishing district" and advocates for a higher level Fisheries Association (FA) as the lobby group to represent the clustered BVCs that share in common the same fishery, the same water body.

Figure # Local Government Structure and the Linkage to LFMA



The participation of the user community in a shared decision-making processes for resource monitoring and control through the formulation and enforcement of fisheries regulations and bylaws is the key element in the co-management governance (Njaya 2007). Therefore, the government’s role in co-management is to create an enabling environment for the co-management partnership and participation of the user communities. The community-based natural resource governance regimes, to a greater or lesser extent, are associated with state or common property systems. As such, state actors set the margins for co-management regimes and define the level of participation of key partners and provide enforcement back-up of the law. The level of participation and characteristics of various co-partners is dynamic in every co-management system. The key partners in co-management include traditional leaders, resource users (fishers, BVC and FA members), the DOF, the judiciary, and local government. Table 1 shows the co-management actors and their roles in Malawi.

Table 1: Co-Management Actors and Their Roles in Malawi

Key actors	Power type	Tasks/Roles	Source of Power
Traditional leaders (TA)	Adjudicate disputes, provide local law enforcement through traditional courts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Authorise use of their beaches for fishing and landing • Resolve conflicts • Development work • Formulate rules especially during recession periods 	Customary, Government
LFMA = Beach Village Committees (BVC) and Fisheries Association (FA)	Implement and ensure compliance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formulate rules and regulations • Enforce regulations • Disseminate messages on fisheries management and health • Resolve conflicts 	Government self-police
Beach chairpersons	Adjudicate disputes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collecting tribute • Resolve conflicts among fishers 	Traditional leader
Fishers	Abide by rules, bylaws and laws	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participate in managing fisheries resources 	Self-police
Department of Fisheries (DoF) (Ministry and Fisheries Advisory Board)	Create or review rules Make decisions about how particular resource or opportunity is to be used Implement and ensure compliance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Manage resource • Formulate and enforce regulations • Conduct research • Licence fishing gears • Train community • Resolve conflicts 	Government
Judiciary (Ministry of Justice)	Adjudicate disputes Draft laws	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sanction offenders • Draft laws 	Government
Local government/ District Councils	Approve bylaws	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collecting fish levies • Resolve trans-boundary conflicts 	Government

Source: Njaya, Donda, & Béné 2011.

For a co-management relationship to be effective, the user community should be empowered to make decisions and enforce the law. Power is a force that alternatively can facilitate, hasten, or halt the process of change promoted through advocacy. Power dynamics exist within specified spaces and place with participatory activities, which can affect power relations in two ways including visible and invisible (VeneKlasen & Miller 2002). Both the DOF, FA and BVCs have the power to create new rules and make decisions regarding the use of resources and have a shared responsibility to enforce them (Table 1). The framework for community participation is stipulated in both the National Fisheries and Aquaculture Policy of 2001 and Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1997.

Throughout Malawi, over 300 BVCs were formed and some 13 FAs, of which 160 BVCs fall within the four lakes of FISH project area.

For effective governance and sustainability of the co-management process, provisions are made for the mobilization of fishers at village level into BVCs (Table 2) and at ecosystem (or district) level into fisheries associations (FAs) The formation of a fisheries Advisory board was also intended as private sector representation to advise the Minister on fisheries matters. The BVCs and FAs, broadly termed as local fisheries management authorities (LFMAs), are supposed to be empowered to regulate fisheries resource exploitation through the formulation and enforcement of rules and local bylaws (Government of Malawi 2000a). There is an additional regulatory framework, the 2000 Participatory Fisheries Management Supplement, that empowers the LFMAs to make or review fishing rules in the interest of the resource users (Government of Malawi 2000b). These bylaws are either backed by traditional courts or by local government, and are approved at District Council level. However, the absence of

District Councilors for the past decade has both halted and frustrated any approvals of BVC and FA bylaws, hampering the power of the LFMA which rely on district authority to back-up their co-management roles.

Table 2: BVCs Registered by District and Waterbody

District	Waterbody	# BVCs	#VDCs
Mangochi	Lake Malombe	14	7
	Upper Shire	13	3
	SEA of Lake Malawi	75	27
	SWA of Lake Malawi	12	12
Balaka	Middle Shire	2	1
Machinga	Lake Chilwa	14	9
	Lake Chiuta	12	5
Zomba	Lake Chilwa	18	10
Total for all districts		160	74

The Decentralization Policy of 1998 gives powers to district councils to manage fisheries resources, while the Devolution Plan of 2003 provides an outline of fisheries functions that are devolved from the central government to the local government. In this context the DOF is responsible for licensing all commercial fishers, while the district councils are in charge of licensing small-scale fishers. The traditional leaders have powers to make decisions regarding allocation of fishing areas to in-migrant fishers however, these powers have often usurped the intended jurisdiction of the BVC. Consequently, conflicts between the fishers and BVCs or among resident and in-migrant fishers frequently abound. The majority of the BVCs around the lake always seek permission from their local leaders to get their power backing before they go out patrolling on the lake during closed seasons. In most cases, local leaders appoint members of the BVCs so that they have indirect influence on the committee's activities (Njaya 2009). In terms of adjudicating disputes and ensuring compliance, the judiciary, through magistrate courts, has powers to decide on penalties for offenders. The range of penalties meted is as stipulated in the Offences and Penalties section of the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act and regulations (Government of Malawi 1997; 2000a). TAs and LFMA on the other hand may not inflict penalties greater than the law, and generally source fees and fines based on "in-kind" equivalents as either livestock, crop produce or fish.


Although powers have been legally provided to BVCs to formulate and enforce bylaws embedded in the regulations for resource conservation (Government of Malawi 1997), such powers are not fully or effectively exercised in some cases due to the strong influence that traditional leaders still exercise on the fisheries through their beach chairpersons. While BVCs are elected, the traditional leaders sometimes appoint these beach chairpersons, resulting in limited accountability and lack of legitimacy (McCracken 1987). There are shortcomings in BVC representation of the fisher communities: they were formed to support and regulate, their role in implementing national policy is limited, they have little empowerment to enforce co-management, and they have little say in local environmental standards and adoption of sustainable fishing best practices. The DOF has a limited enforcement capacity (ie one enforcement unit for the whole country) and simply cannot be everywhere to backstop the BVCs in co-management. The BVCs are a society and, as such,

can sanction or discipline their members, but are sometimes powerless to external forces infringing or breaking their bylaws (e.g., migrant fishers, illegal gear users), and if they do, they face vendettas or reprisals. It is in such cases they seek power through the back-up authority of the TA, LGA or DoF.

1.3. FISH’s Approach to Community Development

FISH has identified key intervention approaches at each point in the TOC (see Figure 1). The starting point for strengthening knowledge and capacity is a threats-based ecosystems approach to biodiversity conservation and climate change adaptation planning that emphasizes participation and empowerment, which is essential for selecting appropriate interventions. The key ecosystems have been identified as the lake areas and their associated sub-catchment basins. Some threats are driven by changes within the lakes while others emanate from adjacent catchment areas. Therefore, the project has employed an integrated land and water-based ecosystem approach that addresses the needs and aspirations of the people living within them, and therefore the emphasis is that governance must be raised from village level (ie from BVC) to FA (i.e. district level) as representing fishing districts (as in the Fisheries Act).

Figure 1: FISH’s TOC for Capacity Strengthening



Institutional capacity and good governance are at the center of creating an enabling environment for the knowledge and implementing actions emerging from the biodiversity threats and climate change vulnerability assessment. Therefore, FISH has selected a suite of tools and methodologies that reinforce and build the constituencies and social capital required for making tough policy choices and fostering good governance at all levels, leading to improved structures, processes, and adaptability to changing conditions across public, private, formal, and informal institutions. The methods emphasize the importance of involving women and disadvantaged groups in assessments and capacity-strengthening efforts. The vision clearly lays out the notion of local ownership as central to the project success, while also emphasizing that strategies for enhancing resilience to climate change and improving biodiversity conservation are not “one-off” efforts. Rather, they will require ongoing and sustainable management as new challenges arise.

Given that fisheries resource management can only be successful if applied at ecosystem level, therefore effective fisheries co-management requires a functionally nested governance system of lake sub-management units (i.e. of clustered BVCs) and associated lake-wide or catchment areas or ecosystem (ie FA level), in which an effective legal and policy framework is in place, policies are implemented, and laws are enforced through upward and downward accountability. Community-based groups, such as BVCs, can play an important role, but are insufficient on their own and need the higher level backing of FA and state. For co-management to work, here must be greater coordination between LFMA institutions and decision-makers at the national level, their counterparts at the local level, and with key stakeholder groups, including the private sector and civil society.

2. Methodology

2.1. The Data Collection Tool

The CPI was first adapted from Pact’s Organizational Performance Index (OPI) by Pact Myanmar to measure the performance of community-level structures, namely the VDCs. The tool’s design is based on the International Development Research Centre’s Capacity Development Outcomes Framework, which highlights four main attributes of organizational performance: effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, and sustainability.

Within the CPI, these attributes have been used as domains upon which the tool is structured. The CPI domains are:

1. Quality of service (effectiveness)
2. Relevance
3. Resource mobilization (sustainability)
4. Efficiency

Each domain is further broken into two sub-domains. Each sub-domain has statements of excellence describing change in performance from level 1 (lowest) to level 4 (highest).

2.2. Adapting the CPI to the FISH Project Context

To measure the performance of the fisheries co-management structures in Malawi, FISH adapted the CPI to fit the context of fisheries management and conservation. Annex 1 contains the Facilitators Guide tailor made to its application in fisheries co-management assessment. The final tool for data collection, adapted to fisheries co-management in in Annex 2. The tool focused on measuring changes in the systems, skills, policies, and procedures of the community-based co-management structures. FISH team members discussed and came to a consensus about what performance at each of the four levels meant, along with the types of evidence that should be in place to demonstrate a co-management structure’s attainment of a given level. Members of the co-management structures also translated the tool to Chichewa for ease of understanding.

Box 1. Vision of Success

Individuals, communities, and institutions are actively and effectively engaged in good practices that improve biodiversity conservation and increase social, ecological, and economic resilience to climate change through sustainable fisheries co-management.

As part of the CPI customization process, the FISH Malawi team also adapted definitions for each of the sub-domains to suit the fisheries sector context. The definitions are described in Table 3.

Table 3: CPI Domains and Definitions by Sub-Domain

Domain	Sub-Domain	Definition of Key Terminology
Quality of service (effectiveness)	Management of services and provisions	Provision: Tangible resources (manpower, money, and material) provided to the committee to promote sustainable co-management of fisheries, as per their terms of reference (TORs). Examples include provisions for tree planting (e.g., seedlings, plastic bags, watering cans, hoes); fish processing (e.g., hygiene, water, refrigeration); money (e.g., revenue from fines, development funds for the district, village savings and loan funds/credit); enforcement personnel; extension services; information, education, and communication (IEC) materials; training; data collection; and government support (community-based organization operations, boundary demarcation, resource assessments, development and implementation of management plans and bylaws, fisheries management agreements).
	Successful activities	Performance target: Sets performance targets and possibly indicators as per their TORs that give/contribute to the measure of success in a specific initiative (e.g., % change in the quantity of fish catches)
Relevance	Representation	Representation: Persons who are engaged in any aspect of fishing associated with a fishing beach, namely the fishers, and which considers men and women equally.
	Monitoring and evaluation	Monitoring and evaluation: At the co-management structure level, is there a continuous process of monitoring and evaluating the services provided by the structure (i.e., do they keep data on achievement of their results)? Does this involve community participation? For example do they keep records of illegal gear confiscated, fines collected, fish catches, and people trained? Do they give reports to communities at co-management structures meetings and maintain registers of boats, fishers, and licenses?
Resource mobilization (sustainability)	Sustainable community-based resources	Natural or human resources: What makes the co-management structure sustainable (e.g., government support, political support, legitimacy, revenue generation, devolution of authority, performance as per its TORs)? How has the co-management structure ensured its sustainability thus far?
	External relations	Stakeholders: How does the co-management structure collaborate/network with other stakeholders outside of its immediate entity/composition to leverage support to perpetuate its role in fisheries co-management (e.g., law enforcement, civil society organizations, members of parliament, district executive committees)?
Efficiency	Timeliness	Timely response: How is the co-management structure implementing its fisheries management plan and in a timely way? Does it respond in a timely manner to the implementation of the bylaws, for example arresting illegal activities (implementation and enforcement)?
	Equitable	Social group: How are provisions allocated to persons who

Domain	Sub-Domain	Definition of Key Terminology
	distribution of resources	are engaged in any aspect of the fishing industry associated with a fishing beach, which includes fishing, boat-making, net-making, fish processing, fish marketing, and fish trading, and considers men and women equally?

2.3. Sampling for Data Collection

Due to the large number of co-management structures in the five targeted fresh-water bodies, 56 structures were initially sampled for the survey using a two-stage stratified random sampling methodology. The 56 structures comprised 35 BVCs, 16 VDCs, and 5 ADCs. This sample size represents 30% of the total 160 co-management structures in the four lakes. The plan to collect data from the ADCs was later dropped after the pilot process showed they had little to no interaction with BVCs and VDCs on fishing issues and could, therefore, not give a fair rating of the structure's performance on fisheries co-management. ADCs were therefore assessed using other tools, such as applied political economy analysis (APEA).

The five freshwater bodies stratified the sampling: SEA and SWA of Lake Malawi, Lake Malombe, Upper Shire, Lake Chilwa, and Lake Chiuta. Within each freshwater body, BVCs and VDCs were randomly selected to arrive at the desired sample size and proportional to the number of BVCs and VDCs in the existing official list obtained from the district councils.

2.4. Data Collection

The administration of the CPI assessment at the onset of the FISH project was to determine the baseline data regarding performance of the fisheries co-management structures in FISH.

Data was collected using the customized CPI tool in June 1–30, 2015, and was facilitated by 15 FISH staff who were trained in the first round of a training-of-trainers, then trained and supported eight extension workers and remaining FISH technicians who were not trained to enable them conduct the assessment in teams of two or three. The facilitation of the CPI took on average three and half hours with each group.

The data collection process was participatory and engaged both the membership of the fisheries co-management structures and community members. Participants were drawn from the existing local structures, including VDCs and BVCs. The community members were involved because the assessment addresses wider community participation in fisheries and benefits accruing to them.

Using participatory processes, the facilitation team took the participants through the objectives of the meeting and clearly explained why they had been selected. Participants were then taken through the CPI processes and divided into groups of five or six people to discuss and score themselves against a particular sub-domain. Proceedings of the discussions in the various groups were displayed on flip charts and presented to the other members who were free to add/edit before building consensus on the final score. These were then captured in the CPI tool, Annex 2.

Detailed discussions and questions were raised during the plenary presentations. In some cases, culture limited women to participate freely among men. In these instances, women formed their own groups and presented first before men to ensure their views were conveyed. The presentations were done in front of all men and women directly and discussions were

done together with the rest of the groups and contributions to each group followed. The discussion activities enabled members of the co-management structures to discuss their performance in each sub-domain and thereafter score themselves on a scale of 1–4. Project staff validated the score based on evidence provided by the co-management structure. If evidence did not correspond to the group’s selected score, the staff would work with the participants to negotiate the score to an appropriate level.

In total, 51 co-management structures were assessed with a 92.9% response rate. Thirty-six (69%) of these were BVCs, and the rest were VDCs. By their composition, VDCs are relatively smaller in size and number compared to the BVCs. Each VDC can be responsible for two to four BVCs, in line with the laid down devolution structure.

Of 53 structures, 14 were co-management based around SEA of Lake Malawi. This is not surprising because SEA constitutes 60% of co-management structures, especially BVCs, in the project area.

Table 4 shows the community co-management structures that FISH assessed using CPI.

Table 4: Co-Management Structures Assessed using CPI

District	Waterbody	Co-Management Institutions		
		BVC	VDC	Total
Mangochi	Lake Malombe	10	2	12
	Upper Shire River	3	1	4
	SEA of Lake Malawi	8	6	14
	SWA of Lake Malawi	5	4	8
Machinga	Lake Chiuta	5	2	5
Zomba	Lake Chilwa	5	2	7
Total		36	17	53

2.5. Data Analysis

After the CPI data was collected, the FISH team entered the CPI scores for each organization into Pact’s Capacity Solutions Platform (CSP) using a standard template and generated various reports and graphs. Quantitative data for each structure was reviewed prior to entry to ensure accuracy against source documents.

The qualitative data collected during the assessments also was captured on the data collection tool and later analyzed using Microsoft Excel to identify key weaknesses per sub-domain. The weaknesses identified will be used to inform development of the capacity-strengthening plan and are further discussed in Section 3.

3. Results

The CPI results in this section are presented by waterbody and highlight the average scores of the structures surveyed per waterbody, followed by a description of what the results show and reasons for the high or low performance.

3.1. Results by Type of Structure

3.1.1. BVC Results

Thirty five BVCs were assessed using the CPI. Of these, 29 rated themselves at level 1 for all four domains, while four rated themselves between levels 1 and 2 on all four domains. This shows that 33 (94%) of all BVCs surveyed are performing well below par on aspects of quality of service, relevance, sustainability, and efficiency in use of fisheries resources.

Figure 2a: Performance of All Clustered BVCs by CPI Domain and Waterbody




Figure 2a shows that overall, the performance of BVCs in Lake Chiuta in all four domains is higher than that of BVCs in other waterbodies. This suggests Chiuta was at a more advanced state of organization, but only marginally so. This can be attributed to people in this area having a sense of ownership and stewardship for the fishery resource and using self-help initiatives to mobilize resources to finance their co-management activities.

Figure 2b: Performance of All Individual BVCs by CPI Domain




Figure 2b shows that two Lake Chiuta BVCs (Misala and Dinji) rated above level 2 on at least three of the four domains. Results are consistent with what was expected because BVCs in this area have previously received extensive training in fisheries co-management. The higher ranking in the domains of efficiency, relevance, and resource mobilization demonstrated by Dinji are indicative of the use of the capacity-strengthening support provided through management agreements under the COMPASS II project. It also enables the structure to respond in a timely manner when action is required to enforce fishing regulations in their area, ensure adequate representation within the committee of the different persons associated with fisheries, and oversee equitable distribution of resources to persons engaged in various aspects of fishing within the BVC area. The higher performance by the BVC is further evidenced by a reduction in the level/incidence of overfishing in the area because this BVC is empowered to take action.

Similarly, the higher ranking of Misala BVC in the domains of resource mobilization and relevance can be attributed to the good leadership of the FA members and traditional leaders who have been working with different organizations locally and in Mozambique that have implemented similar NRM projects. Through this leadership, FA members and traditional leaders have applied the skills and knowledge acquired from trainings/meetings attended. The high performance in resource mobilization shows that the BVC has been effective in leveraging community and external resources to gain support, which perpetuates its sustainability and continued engagement in fisheries co-management. Examples of how the BVC is enhancing its sustainability include the collection of fishing permits from the fishers, which are used to patrol the lake to catch illegal gears. The high performance in the relevance domain also shows that the BVC currently has a good representation of different persons associated with fishing on their beach and takes into consideration participation of both men and women on the committee.

Kasankha BVC, located in SEA of Lake Malawi, and Njerwa BVC, located in Lake Chiuta, rated themselves level 2 in relevance and efficiency, respectively. These were the highest

rated domains for each of the two BVCs because all other domains were rated between level 1 and level 2.

The higher ranking in relevance by Kasankha BVC can be attributed to the training in fisheries co-management that the BVC received from the Malawi Lake Basin Program. The improved capacity has contributed to the BVC being able to ensure representation of various persons involved in fishing along their beach and both men and women being represented on the committee. The BVC also has been able to conduct some monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of the services it delivers to stakeholders by keeping records of illegal gear confiscated, fines collected, and fish catches and reporting back to the community on its activities.

3.1.2. VDC Results

Seventeen VDCs were assessed using the CPI. Of this number, 12 rated themselves at level 1 for all four domains showing limited engagement in co-management, while five rated themselves at level 2 and above in at least one of the four domains. The five VDCs, all located on Lake Malawi, are Chiponda, Lukoloma, Mng'omba, Moto, and Kasankha. Kasankha VDC was the only one in this group with a rating above level 2 in two of the four domains, resource mobilization and relevance.

Figure 3a: Performance of All Clustered VDCs by CPI Domain and Waterbody




Figure 3a shows that performance of VDCs in Lake Chiuta in two domains (quality of service delivery and efficiency) was higher than that of VDCs in other water bodies, while VDCs in SWA of Lake Malawi performed better than the others in the sustainability domain. This can be attributed to previous training given by the Mangochi District Council on proposal writing as part of revenue generation.

Figure 3b: Performance of All Individual VDCs by CPI Domain and Waterbody




Figure 3b shows that the performance of Kasankha VDC is well above that of the other VDCs assessed using the CPI. This level of performance comes as no surprise because this VDC's members have received training in co-management of fisheries and are, therefore, well informed on their roles and responsibilities in fisheries co-management. The VDC also works closely with the Kasankha BVC, which, as described in Section 3.1.1, also ranked at level 2 in relevance and at 1.5 in quality of service and resource mobilization and had a higher performance ranking than the majority of BVCs assessed. Evidence of this better performance is also visible on the ground because SWA of Lake Malawi is managing the fishery resource using TA leaders who recently banned the use of an open water seine net called *Nkacha*. The performance of the two structures in Kasankha is illustrative of the likely gains that can accrue to fisheries co-management in the country because of training and following-up with the structures.

Overall, the results show a higher proportion of BVCs (88%) rated themselves at level 1 for all four domains, while 69% of VDCs rated themselves at the same level for all four domains. This implies that the major proportion of BVCs and VDCs are performing at the lowest level measured by the CPI, and therefore not supporting co-management.

3.2. Results by Waterbody

3.2.1. Lake Chilwa

Seven co-management structures were assessed in Lake Chilwa. Of these, five were BVCs and two were VDCs. Table 5 shows the aggregate CPI scores from each of these structures.

Table 5. Aggregate CPI Scores for BVCs and VDCs in Lake Chilwa

Institution	Benchmark	Score
Mchenga BVC	1.1	1.4
Mtonga BVC	1.1	1.0
Michesi BVC	1.1	1.0
Nyangu BVC	1.1	1.0
Phimbi BVC	1.1	1.0
Kachere VDC	1.3	1.0
Nankhombe VDC	1.3	1.0

Apart from Mchenga BVC, all the other six co-management structures scored 1.0, which fell below the benchmark figure for each type of structure (BVC or VDC). The scores show that both the BVCs and VDCs are performing well below average on the scale of 1 to 4 in co-management of fisheries.

Figures 4a and 4b provide additional insight into the BVCs' performance per CPI domain and sub-domain.

Figure 4a: Performance of Lake Chilwa’s Individual BVCs by CPI Domain





Figure 4b: Performance of Lake Chilwa’s BVCs by CPI Sub-Domain



Figures 4a and 4b show that a majority of the BVCs in Lake Chilwa scored 1.0 in each sub-domain, except for Mchenga BVC, which scored an average of 1.4. Mchenga BVC’s results by sub-domain show that it performed better in three areas: management of provisions, representation, and sustainable community-based resources. This means the BVC has put in place some systems and processes for ensuring transparency and accountability in management of provisions, has equal representation of men and women engaged in fishing activities, and has succeeded in leveraging the community’s support for its activities. The better performance in these sub-domains is evident in how the BVC provides extension services in fisheries co-management to the fishers on its own using the skills and knowledge acquired from previous training provided by WorldFish. However, Mchenga BVC will need to be strengthened in leveraging external support for its activities (e.g., from government),

ensuring timely response to needs of the fishing community, and promoting equitable distribution of resources.

Reasons given for the other Lake Chilwa BVCs' low scores include the lack of systems and tools for planning, monitoring, and documenting BVC activities/successes; participatory engagement of fishing communities; and enabling BVCs to identify and leverage various sources of support. BVCs also cited lack of support from the government, no understanding of what is entailed in fisheries co-management, and lack of training in and awareness of the BVCs' TORs. Lack of planning and budgeting were also mentioned by several BVCs, which is reflective of them not preparing management plans to guide their activities.

Similarly, performance of Lake Chilwa VDCs across all four domains was low, as illustrated in Figures 5a and 5b.

Figure 5a: Performance of Lake Chilwa's VDCs by CPI Domains





Figure 5b: Performance of Lake Chilwa's VDCs by CPI Sub-Domains



Figures 5a and 5b show that the two VDCs in Lake Chilwa rated their performance in all CPI domains low, at level 1. This implies that the VDCs are not effectively managing fisheries provisions, setting performance targets, ensuring equal representation of people involved in fisheries, monitoring or evaluating their performance, leveraging community and external resources to ensure sustainability, implementing their fisheries management plan in a timely manner, or allocating provisions equitably to persons engaged in fisheries in their area of operation. Reasons given by participants for this overall low performance include the lack of systems, tools, and training on how to ensure transparency, accountability, and effective monitoring of VDC activities; cooperation among BVC members; power/authority; presence of new committee members; and general understanding of their TORs.

3.3.2. Lake Chiuta

Five co-management structures were assessed in the Lake Chiuta area, comprising four BVCs and one VDC. Table 6 shows the aggregate CPI scores from each of these structures.

Table 6: Aggregate CPI Scores for BVCs and VDCs in Lake Chiuta

Institution	Benchmark	Score
Dinji BVC	1.1	2.8
Njerwa BVC	1.1	1.6
Mlaluwele BVC	1.1	1.3
Misala BVC	1.1	2.9
Nawanga VDC	1.3	1.1

Table 6 shows that all four BVCs in Lake Chiuta performed above the benchmark, with some, like Dinji and Misala, scoring close to 3.0 on the CPI scale of 1–4. However, Nawanga VDC scored quite low, which is reflective of its members’ lack of knowledge on their roles in fisheries co-management activities because of lack of training.

Figures 6a and 6b illustrate the performance of Lake Chiuta’s BVCs by CPI domain and sub-domains.

Figure 6a: Performance of Lake Chiuta's BVCs by CPI Domains





Figure 6b: Performance of Lake Chiuta's BVCs by CPI Sub-Domains



Figures 6a and 6b show that BVCs in Lake Chiuta are performing above the benchmark of 1.0 in at least one CPI domain. The results for Misala and Dinji stand out above the other BVCs because of sound and functional leadership. Mlaluwele BVC scored lower than all other BVCs because of lack of training because it had just been selected; Nawanga VDC was in a similar position.

Figures 7a and 7b show the performance of Nawanga VDC, the one VDC assessed in Lake Chiuta.

Figure 7a: Performance of Lake Chiuta’s VDC by CPI Domains





Figure 7b: Performance of Lake Chiuta’s VDC by CPI Sub-Domains



Figures 7a and 7b show that Nawanga VDC is performing at the lowest (level 1) in seven of the eight sub-domains, with the highest rating of level 2 for timely response to community needs under the efficiency domain. The latter is evident in how the VDC has been responding in a timely manner to the joint patrol trips (with the BVC) to confiscate illegal gears as part of implementing the fisheries management bylaws and in the VDC’s ability to share achievements on planned patrol trips to fisheries extension workers. The low performance of

Nawanga VDC in the other three domains reflects members being unsure about their roles in fisheries co-management activities and the non-inclusion of fisheries co-management activities in the village development program.

3.3.3. SWA of Lake Malawi

Nine structures were assessed in SWA of Lake Malawi: five BVCs and four VDCs, as listed in Table 7. The BVC and VDC in Kasankha scored above the others and were above their respective cohort benchmarks, possibly as a result of the close collaboration between the Kasankha BVC and VDC to enact tough co-management measures that do not allow any illegal fishing gears to be used in the open waters in these areas.

Table 7: Aggregate CPI Scores for BVCs and VDCs in SWA of Lake Malawi

Institution	Benchmark	Score
Kasankha BVC	1.1	1.5
Madothi BVC	1.1	1.1
Kholowere BVC	1.1	1.0
Chilimba BVC	1.1	1.0
Matewera BVC	1.1	1.0
Chimphepo VDC	1.3	1.1
Kasankha VDC	1.3	2.4
Lizimba VDC	1.3	1.1
Malunga Bolera VDC	1.3	1.0

Figures 8a and 8b help further illustrate the scores of SWA of Lake Malawi’s BVCs by domain and sub-domain.

Figure 8a: Performance of SWA of Lake Malawi’s BVCs by CPI Domains




Figure 8b: Performance of SWA of Lake Malawi’s BVCs by CPI Sub-Domains




Figure 8a shows that, except for Kasankha and Madothi BVCs, all other BVCs in the waterbody have low performance in all four CPI domains. These two BVCs scored higher on quality of service delivery, which illustrates that Kasankha is better at ensuring accountability and transparency in use of services, while Madothi is better at demonstrating the success of the BVCs’ activities in fisheries co-management. Kasankha BVC also scored higher in the sub-domains of representation (meaning it has a good mix of committee members representing the different categories of people involved in fishing in the area), M&E (meaning it has some processes for keeping records of fishing activities and report back to the community), and sustainable community-based resources (meaning it continues to leverage community resources to support its fisheries co-management activities).

Reasons given for the low performance of other BVCs include lack of systems, tools, government support, coordination with the DOF, and understanding of their TORs, as well as the existence of new members who are unfamiliar with the committee is TORs. These reasons are unsurprising and are reflective of the BVCs’ active engagement in carrying out fisheries co-management activities.

Figures 9a and 9b illustrate the performance of the four VDCs in SWA of Lake Malawi.

Figure 9a: Performance of SWA of Lake Malawi’s VDCs by CPI Domains





Figure 9b: Performance of SWA of Lake Malawi’s VDCs by CPI Sub-Domains



Figures 9a and 9b show that three of the four VDCs in SWA of Lake Malawi are performing low on each of the CPI domains and sub-domains. However, Kasankha VDC is performing quite well on keeping records of its activities for M&E purposes, ensuring representation of various members of the fisheries community within its committee, and leveraging community and external resources for sustainable implementation of fisheries co-management in its area of operation. This higher performance by Kasankha VDC can be attributed to its members previously receiving training in co-management of fisheries.

Figure 9b also shows that Lizimba VDC is performing better on external relations, meaning it is collaborating or networking with stakeholders outside of its immediate composition to leverage support that can perpetuate its role in fisheries co-management.

Reasons given for the low performance by VDCs in SWA of Lake Malawi include existence of newly elected members who do not know their roles in fisheries co-management.

3.3.4. SEA of Lake Malawi

Fourteen structures were assessed in SEA of Lake Malawi: eight BVCs and six VDCs, as listed in Table 8. The performance of VDCs was slightly higher than that of the BVCs, with Mng'omba and Lukoloma VDCs rating higher than all other structures in the area with an average score of 1.9 and 1.8, respectively. All BVCs rated at level 1, which signifies low performance across all CPI domains.

Table 8: Aggregate CPI Scores for BVCs and VDCs in SEA of Lake Malawi


Institution	Benchmark	Score
Ng'ombe BVC	1.1	1.0
Mbulaje BVC	1.1	1.0
Chilinda BVC	1.1	1.0
Namitumbu BVC	1.1	1.0
Mtsinje BVC	1.1	1.0
Chowoko BVC	1.1	1.0
Mtondo BVC	1.1	1.0
Makumba BVC	1.1	1.0
Moto VDC	1.3	1.3
Mng'omba VDC	1.3	1.9
Kantande VDC	1.3	1.3
Malamya VDC	1.3	1.0
Lukoloma VDC	1.3	1.8
Chiponda VDC	1.3	1.4

Figures 10a and 10b show the performance of BVCs in SEA of Lake Malawi by domain and sub-domain.

Figure 10a: Performance of SEA of Lake Malawi’s BVCs by CPI Domains



Figure 10b: Performance of SEA of Lake Malawi’s BVCs by CPI Sub-Domains



Figures 10a and 10b show that performance across all BVCs in SEA of Lake Malawi was at the lowest level in all domains and sub-domains. Reasons given for this low performance are similar to other BVCs assessed and include lack of systems, tools, and training on management processes; activity planning and monitoring; and leveraging resources to support co-management activities, as well as the existence of new committee members who had not been briefed on their roles as BVC members at the time of data collection. These issues, in addition to the lack of knowledge of fisheries co-management, guidelines on how to operate, and government support, have led to the BVCs not being able to successfully enforce fishing bylaws in their areas of operation.

The performance of VDCs in SEA of Lake Malawi was higher in most domains and sub-domains, as illustrated in Figures 11a and 11b.

Figure 11a: Performance of SEA of Lake Malawi’s VDCs by CPI Domains





Figure 11b: Performance of SEA of Lake Malawi’s VDCs by CPI Sub-Domains



Figures 11a and 11b show that, except for Malamya VDC, all VDCs ranked themselves above level 1 in at least one domain/sub-domain. The higher performance of these VDCs can be attributed to the different ways they generate funds to carry out fisheries co-management activities and is evident in how the VDCs enforce the implementation of fisheries bylaws in their areas of operation.

3.3.5. Upper Shire River

Four co-management structures were sampled from Upper Shire River: three BVCs and one VDC, as listed in Table 9. All structures scored low in all domains and sub-domains and were below the cohort’s benchmark.

Table 9: Aggregate CPI Scores for BVCs and VDCs in Upper Shire River

Institution	Benchmark	Score
Dimu BVC	1.1	1.0
Madina BVC	1.1	1.0
Kwitambo BVC	1.1	1.0
Malunda VDC	1.3	1.0

Figures 12a and 12b show the performance of BVCs in Upper Shire River by domain and sub-domain.

Figure 12a: Performance of Upper Shire River’s BVCs by CPI Domains





Figure 12b: Performance of Upper Shire River’s BVCs by CPI Sub-Domains



Figures 12a and 12b show that all three BVCs in Upper Shire (Dimu, Madina, and Kwitambo) are performing low in all CPI domains. Reasons given include lack of systems, tools, and training; guidelines on how to operate; and coordination with the DOF, as well as the existence of new committee members who had no knowledge on fisheries co-

management and had not yet been briefed on their roles as BVC members by the time of CPI data collection. This low performance is evident in the lack of support from the DOF in enforcing fisheries regulations in the Upper Shire River area, which has contributed to increasing degradation of fishery resource. Currently, there are no approved bylaws in Lake Malombe because of the absence of councilors in the past 10 years; the APEA and good governance barometer (GGB) conducted by FISH in these areas alluded to the same.

Figure 13: Performance of Upper Shire River’s VDC by CPI Sub-Domains




Figure 13 shows that Malunda VDC’s performance is low in all eight sub-domains. Reasons for this include lack of systems, tools, and training, as cited by other co-management structures; awareness of the VDCs TORs; operating guidelines; and knowledge of fisheries co-management. The presence of new members has also contributed to this low performance, as they do not fully understand their roles.

3.3.6. Lake Malombe

Twelve co-management structures were sampled in the Lake Malombe area: 10 BVCs and two VDCs, as listed in Table 10. All structures demonstrated low performance, as they ranked at level 1 on all domains and subdomains.

Table 10: Aggregate CPI Scores for BVCs and VDCs in Lake Malombe

Institution	Benchmark	Score
Nona BVC	1.1	1.0
Chizura BVC	1.1	1.0
Kausi BVC	1.1	1.0
Chapola BVC	1.1	1.0
Changamire BVC	1.1	1.0
Lundu BVC	1.1	1.0
Kwizimba BVC	1.1	1.0
Likulungwa BVC	1.1	1.0
Chindamba BVC	1.1	1.0

Institution	Benchmark	Score
Mtundu BVC	1.1	1.0
Chimwala VDC	1.3	1.0
Nalikolo VDC	1.3	1.0

Figures 14a and 14b show the performance of BVCs in Lake Malombe by domain and sub-domain.

Figures 14a: Performance of Lake Malombe’s BVCs by CPI Domains





Figure 14b: Performance of Lake Malombe’s BVCs by CPI Sub-Domains




Figures 14a and 14b show that BVCs in Lake Malombe have low performance in all CPI domains. Reasons for this include the lack of systems, tools, and training; operating guidelines; knowledge of fisheries co-management; and power/authority, as well as new

committee members who had no knowledge on fisheries co-management and had not been briefed on their roles as BVC members by the time of CPI data collection.

The performance of VDCs in the Lake Malombe area was equally low and is further illustrated in Figure 15 by sub-domain.

Figure 15: Performance of Lake Malombe’s VDCs by CPI Sub-Domains



Reasons given for the above low performance by the two VDCs in Lake Malombe include that the VDCs are new (just been elected) and have yet to be oriented, the district assembly has yet to organize training for them on their roles and responsibilities, and VDCs were seen as the developmental arm of the district assembly and less as implementers of fisheries resources management.

4. Comparison of CPI, GGB, and APEA Findings

Findings from the CPI assessment overlap in some aspects with findings from the GGB assessment, which FISH conducted after the CPI. The FISH Malawi GGB tool was built around five good governance dimensions: effectiveness, rule of law, participation, accountability, and equity. The GGB assessments found that governance across the four lake bodies (Chilwa, Malawi, Chiuta, and Malombe) was “poor” or “fairly poor,” both of which are ratings within the lower half of the GGB scale of results. A similar observation was made with the CPI assessments, where 88% of BVCs and 69% of VDCs rated their performance at the lowest level (level 1) in all four CPI domains.

The CPI demonstrated that other aspects of representation are weak because the current composition of the co-management structures does not reflect equal representation of men and women nor the inclusion of various categories of persons involved in the fishing industry. Similarly, the GGB described government, TAs, and community-based institutions (in this case BVCs and VDCs) as ineffective and incapable of encouraging the broad-based stakeholder engagement around fisheries co-management. The GGB assessment also found key institutions to be largely unaccountable to the stakeholders and communities they represent, which is reflected in the low CPI scores documented in two sub-domains: M&E and equitable distribution of resources.

Participants at the GGB workshops emphasized the importance of improved planning within and between groups, more regular consultation with fishing communities and other stakeholders, and more joint enforcement activities. This realization ties in well with low CPI ratings in the sub-domains of management of services and provisions, timeliness, sustainable community-based resources, and equitable distribution of resources. These CPI sub-domains assessed the structures on how they plan for and distribute the resources they have, how they engage their stakeholders in planning and decision-making, and how they leverage community and external resources to ensure effective implementation and sustainability. CPI also found that lack of resources hampers the ability of some of the structures to implement effectively, as does weak relations between the ADCs, VDCs, and BVCs, which limit joint actions.

Similar to the GGB and CPI, the APEA also identified the lack of government support to the co-management structures and lack of understanding of their roles and responsibilities as reasons for low performance.

5.0 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The tailoring of the CPI tool to apply to fisheries governance through co-management, took some time for the team to comprehend and understand how it works. However, once a definition table was developed, the comprehension of the terms being used and of the purpose of a CPI was made clear. Likewise, explaining the process to stakeholders being interviewed can create confusion over terminology. This was greatly facilitated during preparation of the Facilitators Manual (Annex 1), by asking the question, “how would you say that in Chichewa?” Arriving at consensus on terms helped the Team in their application of the tool.

The CPI assessment process in itself has also helped to build consensus and common understanding amongst the stakeholders interviewed, regarding their respective co-management structure and capacity, and in the process, potentially also galvanizing the institutions towards positive change. Perhaps one of the main drawbacks was the institutions themselves, especially VDC and ADCs lack of understanding of their roles and TORs in co-management. Whereas this hampered probing, it did reveal that in the initial introduction of LFMA, there was an apparent disconnect between their establishment, and their institutional co-partnership linkages in the local governance structures. Going forward, this emphasizes that co-management is all about partnerships that permit power sharing and this needs to be an integral part of fisheries co-management development.

6. Implications of CPI Results for the FISH Project

The CPI results imply that for the co-management structures to build a conducive enabling environment to conserve and manage freshwater ecosystems, thereby improving the quality of life of the population that depends on fisheries, FISH must implement a package of institutional-strengthening interventions. This will ensure that co-management institutions and local government structures are capacitated to execute their mandate in enforcing bylaws pertaining to fisheries management in Malawi. As mentioned in the beginning of this report, this strengthening of institutional and community capacities for fisheries co-management and biodiversity conservation will help FISH achieve its TOC. In particular, it emphasizes the need to raise the profile of co-management interventions from the beach level (The BVCs) to a higher ecosystem level (The FAs).

Results from the CPI assessments (refer to Figures 2a and 3a on summary of reasons for performance) illustrate that most of the BVCs and VDCs are performing at the lowest level

(level 1) for all four CPI domains and, as such, will need capacity strengthening in areas such as:

1. Institutional: the legal basis for the LFMA to derive power and authority to enforce bylaws needs to be strengthened either through a formal constitution or a management agreement that devolves power to the institution of LFMA
2. Governance: how the different types of co-management structures work together in partnership to enforce the fisheries bylaws
3. Implementation planning and monitoring: how the structures plan for their activities and monitor implementation using the fisheries management plan
4. Mobilization of resources: from community and external sources to enhance operational sustainability
5. Ensuring equity: in distribution of resources and participation of relevant stakeholders in decision-making.
6. Representation of various fisheries stakeholders: and both men and women on the committees

Some of the well-known best practices in fisheries management and conservations include the six steps embedded in the PFM policy, notably: 1) To have a legally constituted LFMA, 2) to have clear jurisdiction over boundaries, 3) to know the site's resources, 4) to have a site management plans, 5) to have site bylaws 6) have been given user rights by the DoF. This includes establishing fish sanctuaries or no-take zones, and enforcing closed seasons and gear size (small net size) restrictions. The FISH project will aim to promote these six steps as well as provide best management practices as they apply to relevant waterbodies, among other capacity-strengthening interventions.

The CPI, as well as the GGB and APEA, demonstrated that groups with higher performance in key areas exist, especially at Lake Chiuta, and that promoting peer-to-peer learning as part of the capacity-strengthening strategy will be important to FISH's activities.

6. Recommendations

To facilitate the strengthening of PFM interventions at FA and BVC levels, and associated local government level, the government needs to strengthen these institutions based on the CPI results that considers all available data that can inform the technical and non-technical capacity-strengthening interventions.

What is needed is for capacity-strengthening support that will:

- a. Target to all institutions operating within the various waterbodies from BVC to their nested FA, from VDC through ADC to district councils, all need to be familiar with PFM policy and its implementation through the 6 steps.
- b. The institutional capacity strengthening will use the ecosystem approach with the FA as the entry point as it focuses the sources of power at local government level, and strengthen linkages to traditional and local government for empowerment.
- c. The capacity building intervention will therefore follow the lead fisher approach looking at the roles and responsibilities of the FA and BVC sub-committees in the fisheries co-management networks. The members of the FA sub-committee will be targeted as "lead" and they in turn when they return to their respective BVC will, build local capacity and understanding in PFM.

- d. As was noted in the APEA, the traditional leaders including traditional authorities act as both champions and spoilers to fisheries co-management as such working at ecosystem level will enable FA to have close contact with these sources of power and government needs to provide the required capacity strengthen mechanism.
- e. FISH capacity building plan should therefore support government, develop trainings session around the 6 steps to PFM and include training and awareness from FA to BVC, and also from TA to BVC, ADC and VDC and also work through the DFO to strengthen district authorities understanding and support for co-management.

To monitor progress, FISH should consider to conduct a re-assessment using the CPI bi-annually to ensure regular monitoring of change in performance that results from the capacity-strengthening support provided by FISH technicians, DOF extension workers, FAs, and BVC trainings. The feedback will tell how effective working with lead fishers has been, providing areas that needs more strengthening and also help learning from the existing best practices that are emerging and can be replicated by peer to peer exchange.

Resources

- GOM. 2000. Fisheries conservation and Management Act 1997. Revised community Participation Fisheries Act. Zomba: Government Printers.
- GoM. (2007). *Annual frame survey report, 2006*. Fisheries Department, Monkey Bay.
- Hara M. 2008. Dilemmas of Democratic Decentralisation in Mangochi District, Malawi: Interest and Mistrust in Fisheries Management. *Conservation & Society* 2008;6:74-86
- Hara, M.M. 2006. Production relations and dynamics among user groups in the artisanal fisheries of Malawi: Implications for Representation in Co-management Arrangements. *MAST2006*, 4 (2): 53-71.
- Njaya, F.J. 2007. Governance challenges for the implementation of fisheries co-management: Experiences from Malawi. *International Journal of Commons* 1(1):121–139
- Njaya, F. 2002. Fisheries co-management in Malawi: Comparative case study of Lakes Malombe, Chilwa and Chiuta. In K. Geheb, & M. Sarch (Eds.) *Africa's inland fisheries: The management challenge* (pp. 9-25). Kampala: Fountain Publishers.
- Sen, S., & Nielsen, J. R. (1996). Fisheries co-management: A comparative analysis. *Marine Policy*, 20(5). 405-418.

Annex 1: CP) Facilitators Guide Tailored to Assessing Fisheries Co-management

Quality of Service Delivery (Effectiveness)	<p><i>Quality of service delivery determines how successful the Co-management structure is in ensuring high quality delivery of services via available mechanisms.</i></p> <p><i>Provisions refer to tangible resources (manpower, money and material) provided to the Co-management structure to promote sustainable co-management of fisheries as per their TORs. Examples of such provisions include provisions for tree planting (seedlings, plastic bags, watering cans, hoes etc.), fish processing (hygiene, water, refrigeration etc.), money (revenue from fines, development funds for the district, VSL funds/credit), enforcement personnel, extension services, IEC materials, training, data collection, support from the government (CBO operations, boundary demarcation, resource assessments, development and implementation of management plans and by-laws, fisheries management agreements).</i></p>			
Sub-domain	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4
Management of Provisions	The Co-management structure has no system for documenting services and provisions for fisheries co-management, and does not have a plan to utilize the services and provisions	The Co-management structure has a system for documenting services and provisions for fisheries co-management, but does not have a plan for using services and provisions	The Co-management structure has a system for documenting services and provisions for fisheries co-management, and a plan for utilizing the services and provisions	The Co-management structure has an accountable and transparent system for documenting and planning for services and provisions, and engages the community on how to utilize the services and provisions
Examples of means of verification	<i>Self-reporting</i>	<i>List of services and provisions received</i>	<i>List of services and provisions received; List of beneficiaries; Utilization plans; and Meeting Minutes</i>	<i>List of services and provisions received; List of beneficiaries; Utilization plans; Meeting Minutes; Signed register of recipients of the services / provisions posted on notice boards and/or Beneficiary Feedback Mechanisms; Progress reports</i>
<p>'Performance Target'- Sets performance targets and possibly indicators as per their TORs that give/contribute to the measure of success in a specific initiative e.g. % change in the quantity of fish catches</p>				
Sub-domain	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4
Successful activities	The Co-management structure has not set specific performance targets to measure the success of their activities	The Co-management structure has set targets with community members to measure the success of the activities	The Co-management structure collects information from the community to verify success of activities versus targets	The Co-management structure documents how successful activities lead to improved fisheries management
Examples of means of verification	<i>Self-reporting</i>	<i>Monitoring & Evaluation Plan; Work Plan with targets; Community Meeting Notes</i>	<i>Monitoring & Evaluation Plan; Community Meeting Notes; Progress reports</i>	<i>Case studies? Stories of change? Project M&E reports; Fisheries data (socio-economic/ bio-physical); DDP reports (state of the environment reports)</i>

Relevance	Relevance is the ability of the Co-management structure to meet the needs of all community members through accessible representation and external relations			
	Representation: Persons who are engaged in any aspect of fishing associated with a fishing beach, namely the fishers, and which considers men and women equally.			
Representation	The Co-management structure makes no effort to include all members of the fishing community in participatory fisheries management planning and decision-making processes	The Co-management structure intentionally includes some of the target fishing community members, but not all in participatory fisheries management planning and decision-making processes	The Co-management structure engages the fishing community in participatory fisheries management planning and decision making, but the results have not led to activities that successfully meet the needs of the fishing community	The Co-management structure engages the fishing community in participatory fisheries management planning and decision making and activities successfully meet the needs of the fishing community
Examples of means of verification	<i>Self-reporting</i>	<i>Meeting participant list; Meeting Minutes; the action plan</i>	<i>Meeting participant list; meeting minutes; action plans including various fisheries social groups</i>	<i>Meeting participant list; meeting minutes; action plans including various fisheries social groups; progress reports</i>

Monitoring and evaluation: At the co-management structure level, is there a continuous process of monitoring and evaluating of the services provided by the structure (i.e. do they keep data on achievement of your results?) Does this involve participation of the community? For example do they keep records of illegal gear confiscated, fines collected, fish catches, people trained, do they give reports to communities at co-management structure meetings, maintain registers of boats, fishers and licenses?

Sub-domain	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4
Monitoring and evaluation	The Co-management structure has not established a plan for monitoring and evaluating fisheries activities	The Co-management structure is in the process of establishing a plan for monitoring and evaluating fisheries activities in order to review successes and challenges	The Co-management structure has established a plan for monitoring and evaluating fisheries activities in order to review successes and challenges. However it is not in use	The Co-management structure is using its plan for monitoring and evaluating fishing activities to consistently make changes to improve activities, and shares learning with other fishing groups.
Examples of means of verification	<i>Self-reporting</i>	<i>Draft Plan for fisheries Monitoring and Evaluation, with targets and tools for data collection that describe what success looks/feels like</i>	<i>Final plan for fisheries Monitoring and Evaluation, but no data has been collected</i>	<i>Plan for fisheries Monitoring and Evaluation; Reports that demonstrate change as a result of analysis and use of data</i>

Resource Mobilization (Sustainability)	Resource Mobilization is the ability to identify and utilize natural and human resources effectively and sustainably			
	'Natural or human resources' – Sources of support that help to make the co-management structure sustainable e.g. government support, political support, legitimacy, revenue generation, devolution of authority, performance as per its TORs etc. How has the co-management structure tapped into these sources to ensure its sustainability thus far?			
Sustainable community-based resources	The Co-management structure has not identified the various sources of support for implementation of sustainable fisheries co-management activities	The Co-management structure has gone through a formal process of identifying sources of support for implementation of sustainable fisheries co-management activities	The Co-management structure is occasionally able to mobilize sources of support for implementation of sustainable fisheries co-management activities	The Co-management structure frequently leverages the sources of support for implementation of sustainable fisheries co-management activities
Examples of means of verification	<i>Self-reported</i>	<i>Documentation of the sources of support</i>	<i>Records of activities implemented with own and other sources of support</i>	<i>Funds account showing ongoing replenishment of resources; Records of activities implemented with own and other sources of support</i>

'Stakeholders'- How does the co-management structure collaborate / network with other stakeholders outside of its immediate entity / composition to leverage support to perpetuate its role in fisheries co-management? For example law enforcement, CSOs, MPs, DEC etc.

Sub-domain	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4
External relations	The Co-management structure has not identified its external stakeholders	The Co-management structure has identified its external stakeholders, but does not engage them formally.	The Co-management structure occasionally engages its stakeholders formally to leverage support to perpetuate its role e.g. advocating for community fishing rights	The Co-management structure regularly engages its stakeholders formally to leverage support to perpetuate its role e.g. communication on fisheries management, law enforcement etc.
Examples of means of verification	<i>Self-reported</i>	<i>Stakeholder list</i>	<i>Stakeholder list; Meeting notes; correspondences to external stakeholders</i>	<i>Work plan and reports showing utilization (and progress) on use of external support</i>

Efficiency	<i>Efficiency is the ability to timely and equitably respond to the community needs</i>			
	<i>Timeliness: How is the co-management structure implementing their fisheries management plan and implementing in a timely way? Do they respond in a timely manner to the implementation of the by-laws for example arresting illegal activities? (Implementation and enforcement).</i>			
Timeliness	The Co-management structure and fishing community implement activities without any clear fisheries management work plan	The Co-management structure and fishing community have a fisheries management work plan, but it is not based on the current needs of the fishing community	The Co-management structure and fishing community develop fisheries work plans together and 50% of the activities are responsive to the fishing community and fisheries management plan	The Co-management structure and fishing community consistently design and implement fisheries management work plans together, with a clear schedule that address current needs in a timely fashion
Examples of means of verification	<i>Self-reported</i>	<i>Work plan; Meeting minutes; Attendance list</i>	<i>Work plan; meeting minutes; attendance list; and achievements compared to work plan</i>	<i>Work plan includes timeline for next review process and next action planning process; Meeting minutes; Attendance list</i>

Social groups: *How are provisions allocated to persons who are engaged in any aspect of the fishing industry associated with a fishing beach, which includes fishing, boat-making, net-making, fish processing, fish marketing and fish trading, and considers men and women equally.*

Equitable distribution of resources	The Co-management structure delivers services / provisions without taking into account the various needs of social groups within the fishing community	The Co-management structure delivers services / provisions by taking into account some of the needs of the social groups within the fishing community, but not consistently	The Co-management structure consistently takes into account in their planning all the needs of the social groups. However only some groups receive the services / provisions	The Co-management structure consistently takes into account in their planning all the needs of the social groups and equitably distributes services / provisions
Examples of means of verification	<i>Self-reported</i>	<i>Documentation of the needs of various social groups; Documentation of the services / provisions delivered to the various social groups versus the needs</i>	<i>Meeting minutes; Attendance list; Documentation of the services / provisions delivered to the various social groups versus the needs</i>	<i>Meeting minutes; Attendance list; Documentation of the services / provisions delivered to the various social groups versus the needs</i>

Annex 2: CPI Data Collection Tool Tailored to Assessing Fisheries Co-management

Directions: Please complete two forms for each CPI facilitated. One form should remain with the co-management structure, while the other is for Pact's data entry and monitoring process. First complete the top section so that we are able to better disaggregate data for your project as well as for the Global Indicator for Capacity Development. Then proceed to the Table, where in the second column you will write in the final score for each sub-domain. In the third column write in the evidence you reviewed and how it met the score given. In columns fourth and fifth column, note the reasons given by participants to explain the score for each sub-domain and required action(s).

Date of Data Collection: _____

Country: _____

Name of the District: _____

Name of the Traditional Authority: _____

Name of the Group Village: _____

Name of the Village: _____

Name of the Co-management structure: _____

Length of partnership with Pact/FISH: [Less than one year

Data collection method: [Bronze

Types of CD support: [In Kind Grant

Project Name and Code through which support is provided:

Domain / Sub-domain	Sub-Domain Score	Verification of Evidence	Checklist of responses to the 'why' question	Proposed actions
<p>Management of provisions</p> <p>Level 1: The Co-management structure has no system for documenting services and provisions for fisheries co-management, and does not have a plan to utilize the services / provisions</p> <p>Level 2: The Co-management structure has a</p>		Self-reported	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is no system in place • No tools are in place • We've never had government support • Lack of training • Not aware of their TORs • Lack of guidelines on how to do things • Corruption • Lack of power / authority • No knowledge on fisheries co-management • Working in isolation • No coordination with the Department of Fisheries • Not relevant at ADC level • No sensitization on FISH Project 	

Domain / Sub-domain	Sub-Domain Score	Verification of Evidence	Checklist of responses to the 'why' question	Proposed actions
<p><i>system for documenting services and provisions for fisheries co-management, but does not have a plan for using services and provisions</i></p> <p><i>Level 3: The Co-management structure has a system for documenting services and provisions for fisheries co-management, and a plan for utilizing the services and provisions</i></p> <p><i>Level 4: The Co-management structure has an accountable and transparent system for documenting and planning for services and provisions, and engages the community on how to utilize the services and provisions</i></p>		<p><i>List of services and provisions received;</i></p> <p><i>List of services and provisions received; List of beneficiaries; Utilization plans; and Meeting Minutes;</i></p> <p><i>List of services and provisions received; List of beneficiaries; Utilization plans; Meeting Minutes; Signed register of recipients of the services / provisions posted on notice boards and/or Beneficiary Feedback</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><i>• ADC only active when there is a project in the area</i><i>• Conflicts between the ADC and Traditional Authority</i><i>• New committee members</i>	

Domain / Sub-domain	Sub-Domain Score	Verification of Evidence	Checklist of responses to the 'why' question	Proposed actions
		<i>Mechanisms; Progress reports</i>		
<p>Successful Activities</p> <p><i>Level 1: The Co-management structure has not set specific performance targets to measure the success of their activities</i></p> <p><i>Level 2: The Co-management structure has set targets with community members to measure the success of their activities</i></p> <p><i>Level 3: The Co-management structure collects information from the community to verify success of activities versus targets</i></p> <p><i>Level 4: The Co-management structure documents how successful activities lead to improved fisheries management.</i></p>		<p><i>Self-reported</i></p> <p><i>Monitoring & Evaluation Plan; Work Plan with targets; Community Meeting Notes</i></p> <p><i>Monitoring & Evaluation Plan; Community Meeting Notes; Progress reports</i></p> <p><i>Case studies? Stories of change? Project M&E reports; Fisheries data (socio-economic/ bio-physical); DDP reports (state of the environment reports)</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>There is no system in place</i> • <i>No tools are in place</i> • <i>We've never had government support</i> • <i>Lack of training</i> • <i>Not aware of their TORs</i> • <i>Lack of guidelines on how to do things</i> • <i>Corruption</i> • <i>Lack of power / authority</i> • <i>No knowledge on fisheries co-management</i> • <i>Working in isolation</i> • <i>No coordination with the Department of Fisheries</i> • <i>Not relevant at ADC level</i> • <i>No sensitization on FISH Project</i> • <i>ADC only active when there is a project in the area</i> • <i>Conflicts between the ADC and Traditional Authority</i> • <i>New committee members</i> 	

Domain / Sub-domain	Sub-Domain Score	Verification of Evidence	Checklist of responses to the 'why' question	Proposed actions
<p>Representation</p> <p><i>Level 1: The Co-management structure makes no effort to include all members of the fishing community in participatory fisheries management planning and decision-making processes.</i></p> <p><i>Level 2: The Co-management structure intentionally includes some of the target fishing community members, but not all in participatory fisheries management planning and decision-making processes.</i></p> <p><i>Level 3: The Co-management structure engages the fishing community in participatory fisheries management planning and decision making, but the results have not led to activities that successfully meet the needs of the fishing community</i></p> <p><i>Level 4: The Co-management structure engages the fishing community in participatory fisheries management planning and</i></p>		<p><i>Self-reported</i></p> <p><i>Meeting Minutes; Meeting attendance list; the action plan</i></p> <p><i>Meeting participant list; meeting minutes; action plans including</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>There is no system in place</i> • <i>No tools are in place</i> • <i>We've never had government support</i> • <i>Lack of training</i> • <i>Not aware of their TORs</i> • <i>Lack of guidelines on how to do things</i> • <i>Corruption</i> • <i>Lack of power / authority</i> • <i>No knowledge on fisheries co-management</i> • <i>Working in isolation</i> • <i>No coordination with the Department of Fisheries</i> • <i>Not relevant at ADC level</i> • <i>No sensitization on FISH Project</i> • <i>ADC only active when there is a project in the area</i> • <i>Conflicts between the ADC and Traditional Authority</i> • <i>New committee members</i> 	

Domain / Sub-domain	Sub-Domain Score	Verification of Evidence	Checklist of responses to the 'why' question	Proposed actions
<i>decision making, and activities successfully meet the needs of the fishing community</i>		<i>various fisheries social groups</i> <i>Meeting participant list; meeting minutes; action plans including various fisheries social groups; progress reports</i>		

Domain / Sub-domain	Sub-Domain Score	Verification of Evidence	Checklist of responses to the 'why' question	Proposed actions
Monitoring and Evaluation <i>Level 1: The Co-management structure has not established a plan for monitoring and evaluating fisheries activities</i> <i>Level 2: The Co-management structure is in the process of establishing a plan for monitoring and evaluating fisheries activities in order to review successes and challenges</i> <i>Level 3: The Co-management structure has established a plan for monitoring and</i>		<i>Self-reported</i> <i>Draft plan for fisheries Monitoring and Evaluation, with targets and tools for data collection that describe what success looks/feels</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>There is no system in place</i> • <i>No tools are in place</i> • <i>We've never had government support</i> • <i>Lack of training</i> • <i>Not aware of their TORs</i> • <i>Lack of guidelines on how to do things</i> • <i>Corruption</i> • <i>Lack of power / authority</i> • <i>No knowledge on fisheries co-management</i> • <i>Working in isolation</i> • <i>No coordination with the Department of Fisheries</i> • <i>Not relevant at ADC level</i> • <i>No sensitization on FISH Project</i> • <i>ADC only active when there is a project in the area</i> • <i>Conflicts between the ADC and Traditional Authority</i> • <i>New committee members</i> 	

Domain / Sub-domain	Sub-Domain Score	Verification of Evidence	Checklist of responses to the 'why' question	Proposed actions
<p><i>evaluating fisheries activities in order to review successes and challenges. However it is not in use</i></p> <p><i>Level 4: The Co-management structure is using its plan for monitoring and evaluating fishing activities to consistently make changes to improve activities, and shares learning with other fishing groups</i></p>		<p><i>like</i></p> <p><i>Final plan for fisheries Monitoring and Evaluation, but no data has been collected</i></p> <p><i>Plan for fisheries Monitoring and Evaluation; Reports that demonstrate change as a result of analysis and use of data</i></p>		
<p><i>Sustainable community based resources</i></p> <p><i>Level 1: The Co-management structure has not identified the various sources of support for implementation of sustainable fishing activities</i></p> <p><i>Level 2: The Co-management structure has gone through a formal process of identifying sources of support for implementation of sustainable fishing activities</i></p> <p><i>Level 3: The Co-</i></p>		<p><i>Self-reported</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>There is no system in place</i> • <i>No tools are in place</i> • <i>We've never had government support</i> • <i>Lack of training</i> • <i>Not aware of their TORs</i> • <i>Lack of guidelines on how to do things</i> • <i>Corruption</i> • <i>Lack of power / authority</i> • <i>No knowledge on fisheries co-management</i> • <i>Working in isolation</i> • <i>No coordination with the Department of Fisheries</i> • <i>Not relevant at ADC level</i> • <i>No sensitization on FISH Project</i> • <i>ADC only active when there is a project in the area</i> • <i>Conflicts between the ADC and Traditional Authority</i> • <i>New committee members</i> 	

Domain / Sub-domain	Sub-Domain Score	Verification of Evidence	Checklist of responses to the 'why' question	Proposed actions
<p><i>management structure is occasionally able to mobilize sources of support for implementation of sustainable fishing activities</i></p> <p><i>Level 4: The Co-management structure frequently leverages the sources of support for implementation of sustainable fishing activities</i></p>		<p><i>Documentation of the sources of support</i></p> <p><i>Records of activities implemented with own and other sources of support</i></p> <p><i>Funds account showing ongoing replenishment of resources; Records of activities implemented with own and other sources of support</i></p>		

Domain / Sub-domain	Sub-Domain Score	Verification of Evidence	Checklist of responses to the 'why' question	Proposed actions
<p>Timeliness</p> <p><i>Level 1: The Co-management structure and fishing community implement activities without any clear fisheries management work plan</i></p> <p><i>Level 2: The Co-management</i></p>		<p><i>Self-reported</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>There is no system in place</i> • <i>No tools are in place</i> • <i>We've never had government support</i> • <i>Lack of training</i> • <i>Not aware of their TORs</i> • <i>Lack of guidelines on how to do things</i> • <i>Corruption</i> • <i>Lack of power / authority</i> • <i>No knowledge on fisheries co-management</i> • <i>Working in isolation</i> • <i>No coordination with the Department of Fisheries</i> 	

Domain / Sub-domain	Sub-Domain Score	Verification of Evidence	Checklist of responses to the 'why' question	Proposed actions
<p><i>structure and fishing community have a fisheries management work plan, but it is not based on the current needs of the fishing community</i></p> <p><i>Level 3: The Co-management structure and fishing community develop fisheries work plans together and 50% of the activities are responsive to the fishing community and fisheries management plan</i></p> <p><i>Level 4: The Co-management structure and fishing community consistently design and implement fisheries management work plans together, with a clear schedule that address current needs in a timely fashion</i></p>		<p><i>Work plan; meeting minutes; attendance list</i></p> <p><i>Work plan; meeting minutes; attendance list; and achievements compared to work plan</i></p> <p><i>Work plan includes timeline for next review process and next action planning process; Meeting minutes; Attendance list</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Not relevant at ADC level</i> • <i>No sensitization on FISH Project</i> • <i>ADC only active when there is a project in the area</i> • <i>Conflicts between the ADC and Traditional Authority</i> • <i>New committee members</i> 	
<p><i>Equitable Distribution of resources</i></p> <p><i>Level 1: The Co-management structure delivers</i></p>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>There is no system in place</i> • <i>No tools are in place</i> • <i>We've never had government support</i> • <i>Lack of training</i> • <i>Not aware of their TORs</i> 	

Domain / Sub-domain	Sub-Domain Score	Verification of Evidence	Checklist of responses to the 'why' question	Proposed actions
<p><i>services / provisions without taking into account the various needs of social groups within the fishing community</i></p> <p><i>Level 2: The Co-management structure delivers services / provisions by taking into account some of the needs of the social groups within the fishing community, but not consistently</i></p> <p><i>Level 3: The Co-management structure consistently takes into account in their planning all the needs of the social groups. However only some groups receive the services / provisions</i></p> <p><i>Level 4: The Co-management structure consistently takes into account in their planning all the needs of the social groups and equitably distributes services / provisions</i></p>		<p><i>Self-reported</i></p> <p><i>Documentation of the needs of various social groups; Documentation of the services / provisions delivered to the various social groups versus the needs</i></p> <p><i>Meeting minutes; Attendance list; Documentation of the services / provisions delivered to the various social groups versus the needs</i></p> <p><i>Meeting minutes; Attendance list; Documentation of the services / provisions delivered to the various social groups versus the needs</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Lack of guidelines on how to do things</i> • <i>Corruption</i> • <i>Lack of power / authority</i> • <i>No knowledge on fisheries co-management</i> • <i>Working in isolation</i> • <i>No coordination with the Department of Fisheries</i> • <i>Not relevant at ADC level</i> • <i>No sensitization on FISH Project</i> • <i>ADC only active when there is a project in the area</i> • <i>Conflicts between the ADC and Traditional Authority</i> • <i>New committee members</i> 	